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NOTE
FEDERAL TAXATION
SALE OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST-A CAPITAL GAIN?
A current prediction of the tax treatment to be accorded the sale of a
partnership interest involves considerations which have in recent years crystal-
lized into recognizable form. They must be distilled from pertinent tax cases;
for the Code presents, without choosing from, alternatives between capital
gains and ordinary income taxation.'
The arguments advanced in favor of both Code sections have heavily
utilized theoretical concepts as to the nature of a partnership. The dispute,
ultimately, has been phrased in terms of whether a partnership is an entity
or merely a co-ownership of assets. The Revenue Act does not explicitly
adopt either theory2 nor is it possible to infer an intent of Congress from the
few separate sections which relate to some aspects of partnership taxation.3
Traditionally the characteristics of a partnership in other than tax relations
cannot be considered binding.4
1. INT. REV. CODE §§ 11, 12 and § 117(c).
2. See INT. REV. CODE §§ 181-190, 113(a) (13); Cf. INT. REV. CODE §§ 42(a), 43. INT.
REV. CODE § 181 imposes the burden of payment on the individual partner. The tax pay-
ment is based on the partner's share of distributive income from the partnership for its
preceding tax year. INT. REV. CODE §§ 18 , 183, 188. The partnership, however, must
file a return for information purposes. See INT. REV. CODE § 188. Thus these few sec-
tions view the individual, not the partnership, as the taxable entity. No mention is made
of the tax treatment to be accorded the sale of a partnership interest. Cf. § 183 (capital
assets of the partnership).
3. As to deduction of individual losses from partnership gains or partnership losses
from individual gains, the decisions, which turn on precise statutory interpretation, recog-
nize the partnership as an entity in certain cases while refusing to do so in others. See
Johnston v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1936) (no cross deduction) ; Jennings v.
Commissioner, 110 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1940) (allowed deduction of individual wagering
losses from similar partnership gains) ; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 83 (1940)
(declared the pre-1933 and post-1937 law to be that cross-deduction could be taken);
Commissioner v. Lamont, 156 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1946) (cross-deduction disallowed under
1936 Revenue Act).
As to the dual nature of a partnership for income taxation, see Neuberger v. Com-
missioner, 311 U. S. 83, 88 (1940).
Compare the numerous sections relating to taxation of corporations. See e.g., INT.
REv. CODE §§ 13, 14, 15, 26, 27, 28, 52, 101, 113, 501-511. A tax is imposed upon the cor-
porate entity itself, as distinct from the tax on each stockholder. INT. REV. CODE § 13.
4. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1942). Mr. Justice Frank-
furter once remarked, "The importation of . . distinctions and controversies from the
law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable
tax system. Essentially the same interests, judged from the point of view of wealth, will
be taxable or not, depending upon elusive and subtle casuistries which may have their
historic justification but possess no relevance for tax purposes." Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U. S. 106, 118 (1940). Compare, however, Judge Learned Hand's discussion of the
common law, equity, and bankruptcy concepts of a partnership in Commissioner v. Lehman,
165 F.2d 383, 384-385 (2d Cir. 1948).
NOTE
The official approach of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, partly support-
ed and partly censured in the literature,' has been that every partner owns an
aliquot part of each partnership asset.' Sale of the interest therefore is nothing
more than sale of a moiety in each of the assets affected.7 Admittedly this
theory of comminution has slight tacit support in the Revenue Acts" and in
the conception of a partnership in the Uniform Partnership Act.9 Not coinci-
dentally, it also would produce the largest amount of revenue where gain
results from sale-the increase from the sale of those assets which individually
would not fit the tax definition of capital assets are thus taxed at ordinary
rather than capital rates. The courts, in an overwhelming majority of cases,
have ruled against the argument that the taxpayer owns but an undivided
share of each asset.'
5. Brookes, The Strange Nature of the Partnership Under the Income Tax Law, 5
TAx L. REv. 35 (1949) ; Rabkin and Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax
Laws, 55 HARv. L. R.v. 909 (1942).
6. In G. C. M. 10092, XI-1 Cum. BULL. 114 (1932), this position was carefully set
forth. (But see Henry Wilson, 16 B. T. A. 1280 (1929), in which the Commissioner had
won on the opposite theory.) An example by the Chief Counsel demonstrates the co-
ownership theory applied to the problem of basis. A mill contributed by A cost him
$10,000 but at contribution was worth $100,000. A would not be taxed on a $90,000 gain
at contribution because no gain was realized-not because no gain was recognized.. B
contributed $100,000 in cash. Profits were to be shared equally. The partnership sold
the mill for $200,000. B would 'be taxed on $50,000, A on $140,000 ($50,000 plus the
$90,000 the property had appreciated before its transfer to the partnership). Thus the
partnership entity would be disregarded. Two early cases, very similar to the above ex-
ample, went directly contrary to the Bureau's theory. Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d
683 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (1934) ; Helvering v. Archbold, 70 F.2d
720 (2d Cir. 1934). Although the direct holdings of those cases were disapproved by
Congress, Revenue Act of 1934, § 113(a) (13), 48 STAT. 708 (1934), their underlying
theory is very much alive. See Robert E. Ford, 6 T. C. 499 (1946), and G. C. M. 26379,
1950 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 10 at 4 (1950), which expressly revoked G. C. M. 10092.
7. Thus the underlying co-ownership theory of G. C. M. 10092, XI-1 Cum. BULL.
114 (1932), was carried over from its application to the basis issue to the problem whether
there was a partnership "interest" which could be sold. The Bureau concluded that for
tax purposes a partnership was not an entity, hence there was no "interest" which was
a capital asset. See e.g., the government's position in Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d
383, 384 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Kessler v. United States, 124 F.2d 152; 154 (3d Cir. 1941);
Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A. 280, 282 (1935).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. Uniform Partnership Act §§ 6, 8, 18, 25, 31, 42.
10. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950) ; LeSage v. Commissioner,
173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Shapiro, 178 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1949);
Commissioner v. Smith, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 818 (1949);
Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 819 (1948);
United States v. Landreth, 164 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Thornley v. Commissioner, 147
F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Davis
v. United States, 4 P-H 1950 FED. TAX SERV. 1 72,396 (1950) ; Estate of Aaron Lowen-
stein, 12 T. C. 694 (1949) ; Estate of William T. Jones, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEc. [ 44,028
(1944) ; George R. McClellan, 42 B. T. A. 124 (1940) ; Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B. T. A.
280 (1935). See also Kessler v. United States, 124 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Stilgenbaur
v. United States, 115 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Gene Bass, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEC.
50,055 (1950). Cf. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935) ; Doyle v. Commis-
sioner, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Hill
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An occasionally propounded hypothesis, based on comminution, that in-
dividual assets have not been held for the requisite period (although the tax-
payer was a partner for that term) has been equally ill-fated." The courts
consistently have held the sale of a partnership interest (as distinguished from
the sale of the entire partnership 2 ) is the sale of a capital asset. In determin-
ing whether an interest has passed, inquiry has been directed, in each case, to
whether a share of a going concern was sold. 3 This deemphasis of the con-
ceptualistic approach is most laudable. That the partnership interest is viewed
as a capital asset should only incidentally, not causally, be related to the theory
that the partnership is an entity. 4
General Counsel's Memorandum 26379, issued in May, 1950,11 essentially
realigns the Bureau with the judicial approach. Although the Commissioner
has finally abandoned comminution, the memo states that the "transaction in
substance and .effect, as distinguished from form and appearance, [must be]
v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1930) ; Estate of Herbert B. Hatch, 14 T. C. 251
(1950) ; James W. McAfee, 9 T. C. 720 (1947) ; W. Frank Carter, 36 B. T. A. 60 (1937).
Contra: City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 98 (Ct. Cl. 1942).
11. Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948); Thornley v. Commis-
sioner, 147 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1945); Frank Killian, P-H 1944 TC MEM. DEC. 1 44,244
(1944).
12. Sale of a whole partnership would not appear to differ from the sale of a going
individual proprietorship. In Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) (judge
Frank dissenting), Judge Learned Hand held that a "whole business" was not in Anglo-
American law considered an entity and not therefore a capital asset. He acknowledged
that the Second Circuit had held that a partner's interest in a partnership was a capital
asset. This, it seems, could logically be applied where the "interest" amounts to owner-
ship of the whole. Compare Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1942).
13. See note 21 infra. "The decision must turn on the meaning of the phrase 'capital
assets' as that phrase is ordinarily understood. . . . [I]t means all capital invested plus all
surplus accounts or undivided profits left in the business . . . and in addition . . .
good will. . . . [W]here . . . there is a sale of a part interest in a going concern, no
change is wrought [by dissolution] in the character of the property sold." (Italics added.)
Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1942).
14. ". . [A] decision of this more or less troublesome question [whether a partner-
ship is an entity] would throw no light on the present controversy ... " Commissioner
v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1942).
15. G. C. M. 26379, 1950 INT. REv. BULL. No. 10 at 4 (1950) states: ". , . The
overwhelming weight of authority is contrary to the position heretofore taken by the
Bureau, viz., that the sale of a partnership interest is a sale of the selling partner's
undivided interest in each specific partnership asset. [Citations omitted.] See also
[citation omitted] wherein the court . .. held that the basis for computing gain or loss
on an asset purchased by a partnership and sold after the retirement of one of the part-
ners was the original cost of such asset when acquired by the firm.
"It is accordingly the opinion of this office that the sale of a partnership interest
.should be treated as the sale of a capital asset under the provisions of section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code. The application of this rule should, of course, be limited to
those cases in which the transaction in substance and effect, as distinguished from form
and appearance, is essentially the sale of a partnership interest. (See Estate of Herbert
B. Hatch et al. Iv. Commissioner, 14 T. C. 251.) For example, payments made to a re-
tiring partner which represent his distributive share-of earnings for past services should
be treated as ordinary income rather than the proceeds derived from a sale of his
interest. [Citations omitted.] .. .
"G. C. M. 10092 (C. B. XI-1, 114 (1932) is hereby revoked . .
NOTE
essentially the sale of a partnership interest." Passage of title to only the
interest in a part of the assets will not suffice to obtain capital gains treatment.
"Payments made to a retiring partner which represent his distributive share of
earnings for past services should be treated as ordinary income rather than the
proceeds derived from a sale of his interest."'16
The standards which the Commissioner will follow in allowing capital
rates are predictable. But of primary concern to the counselor are definitions
of the elements necessary to a strong bargaining position or to successful
litigation and cases unfavorable to the Bureau which present a dissimilar inter-
pretation of what constitutes an interest.
1  "
A synthesis of the cases reveals it to be indispensable that a convincing
picture of earning potential be shown.' 8 And, although the Code definition of
capital assets does not coincide with the business usage of the term, 19 the two
become essential equivalents in this area. If the sale has been of income or the
right to income, as distinguished from earning potential, the more desired
taxation will not be attained.'
The most important consideration in finding an earning potential is the
presence of partnership assets, although these need not be the primary pro-
ducers of income to the business. Even though certain assets included in the
16. Ibid.
17. See e.g., H. R. Smith, 10 T. C. 398 (1948), affirmed, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 818 (1949) ; L. F. Long, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEc. IT 47,155
(1947), affirmed, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied; 338 U. S. 818. (1949);
Estate of William T. Jones, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. 1 44,028 (1944).
18. See note 10 supra. The criteria necessary to prove actual sale of an interest and
intent to sell it are the same criteria which were necessary to obtain capital gains rates
when the Commissioner expounded comminution. During that period the courts in-
variably required these indicia before they would follow the court-established principle
that an interest was a capital asset.
19. See note 13 supra. INT. REv. CODE § 117(a) (1) (B) excludes property used in
the trade or business, of a character subject to allowance for depreciation, or real property
used in the trade or business from the term "capital assets"; this obviously departs from
the common understanding of "capital assets." Compare, however, the effect of § 117(j)
which in effect cancels out the above exclusion.
20. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U. S. 28 (1941). In Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d
590 (2d Cir. 1937), S retired from a law firm. The articles provided that on withdrawal
the lease, library, and other named assets were to belong to the continuing business. The
c-payment was to be for S's share of earnings up to the time of withdrawal. The gain to
S was taxed at ordinary rates. This was so although as evinced by later cases the Second
Circuit adopted capital gains treatment of a sale of a partnership interest where more
than the right to income was sold. Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948).
See also Munson v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1938). Cf. Merrill v. Commis-
sioner, 173 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1949).
Upon leaving a law partnership a partner agreed that for his interest in accounts
receivable and for unbilled claims he should be paid a lump sum of $20,000. But the
agreement specified that if this was more or less than his actual share, remittance was to
be made. The dispute in this case was whether a further remittance made to him accord-
ing to the agreement was capital gain. Held: A mere distribution of earnings, hence
ordinary income. James W. McAfee, 9 T. C. 720 (1947). See also Doyle v. Commis-
sioner, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"interest" sold will not qualify as capital assets individually, lumping them
together in an income-producing unit results in an asset which is capital.21
An almost infinite variety of assets can be supposed which are sufficient
evidence of earning power. Real property, plant and machinery, and inven-
tories are tangibles which are normally fruitful of income. But most intangi-
bles, such as securities, good will, contracts, and firm names are also produc-
tive.2 2 Bona fide capital accounts, indicating earning or investment power,
tend to persuade tribunals that partnership assets consist of other than earned
income standing alone.
2 3
In order to create an earning unit in which an interest may be held,
assets must necessarily be contributed or accumulated 24 by a partner or
partners. Thus one who fails to add to the assets which constitute the produc-
tive foundation of the earning entity can inferentially be said not to own an
"interest." That this is at best a questionable inference is indicated by a case
which upheld the application of capital rates where the seller made no contribu-
tion.25 In the ordinary arms length transaction contribution would be made;
but in other cases in the absence of an initial cash contribution, a record in
favor of capital gains taxation may be inexpensively built. If only good will
or prestige are contributed, a valuation of these on the firm books could be
21. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1942) ".. • The price
paid .. .may have been based partly on assets excluded under the act from the phrase
,capital assets' . . .but the sale made by respondent was not a sale of those assets ...
Respondent sold all of his interest in the partnership . . .as a going concern, which in
all essentials is different from the ordinary assets of the partnership used in the usual
course of business . . ." (Italics added.)
22. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950) (partnership name, good
will, fixtures, library, cash, billed and unmatured fees, and accounts receivable) ; United
States v. Shapiro, 178 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1949) (apartment house); Commissioner v.
Smith, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1949) (cash, accounts receivable, inventory and fixed
assets) ; United States v. Landreth, 164 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1947) (contracts, plant and
machinery) ; United States v. Anderson, 161 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1947) (patents and trade
marks) ; Thornley v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 416 (3rd Cir. 1945) (contracts, good will,
real and personal property). See also Stilgenbaur v. United States, 115 F.2d 283 (9th
Cir. 1940) (bonds, real estate, leases, and inventory) ; Munson v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d
363 (2d Cir. 1938) (stock exchange seat).
23. LeSage v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Munson v Commissioner,
100 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1938) ; James W. McAfee, 9 T. C. 720 (1947) ; George R. McClel-
lan, 42 B. T. A. 124 (1940).
24. See Gustav Hirsch, P-H 1942 TC MEA. DEc. 42,073 (1942) ; 97 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 52, 59 (1948).
25. In Walter J. Gresham, 8 T.C.M. 77 (1949), the Commissioner contended that
since taxpayer had made no contribution, gain from the sale of his interest was ordinary
income. The court; however, held that the portion received which was attributable to
income should be taxed as income and that portion disclosed to be capital gain should be
so taxed (with basis of zero). Compare Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935).
One ground for upholding an income tax levied on payments received by the estate for
deceased's interest in the partnership was that no capital contribution had been made.
Perhaps this alone would not have been controlling without the presence of other elements
in the case. One of these was that the payment was to be as if the estate were a partner
for a year after the decedent's death.
NOTE
made."0 This should be done at the time of entry or at least a reasonable
length of time before sale. Likewise, a small cash donation to the partnership
might weaken the objection that there has been no contribution in fact.
Accounts receivable and unbilled claims for services or goods, alone,
are not assets which produce earnings-they are earnings.27 Nevertheless,
current decisions indicate that when a partnership owns assets in addition to
accounts receivable or unmatured claims, the combination will support treat-
ing the entire "sale" as that of a capital asset. The question then is one of
determining how large a ratio of other assets to accounts receivable will be
required before capital gains treatment may be achieved.
The Commissioner, protesting against this approach, has taken the posi-
tion, at least where a service firm is involved,2 that the sale price of an
interest should be divided between what is earned income (accounts receivable
and unbilled claims as well as distributable income) and what represents the
sale price for the interest. The former would be taxed at ordinary, the latter
at capital rates. His argument for allocation is implicit in G.C.M. 26379. A
number of valid grounds support the Commissioner's stand. Accounts re-
ceivable are thought of as ordinary income by most businessmen. Unlike cash
on hand or bank accounts, decision whether the amounts represented by uncol-
lected accounts are to be distributed as profits or plowed back into the firm as
investment usually awaits their liquidation. And in sale of a deceased partner's
interest such lumping apparently is disallowed by statute." But a split of case
authorities leaves clouded the question, and hence the practical propriety, of
allocation." In certain instances, therefore, non-allocation between what is
26. Prestige, in service firms, is one of the most important factors necessary to suc-
cess in business and there appears no reason why a valuation set upon it should not be
respected.
27. Doyle v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939). See note 20 supra.
28. G. C. M. 26379, 1950 INT. REV. BULL. No. 10 at 4 (1950). Including earned in-
come in the sale price for the interest will not evade the Bureau's position. The Com-
missioner could assess ordinary rates on the entire sale price but the existence of such an
intention is denied. Hence he will allocate to ordinary income that proportion of the gale
price which stems from ordinary earnings.
Quaere: Will this position be followed as to a non-service firm? Accounts receiv-
able possessed by such a firm cannot be equated to income in the course of business, for
a large part of these accounts receivable will serve only to cover costs. That part which
can be traced to cost represents the equivalent of inventories and certainly should be in-
cluded in the "interest" since inventories are properly includible. Only the margin would
be a proper subject of apportionment. It is doubtful that such a policy will be adopted
for the methods of figuring how much is margin, or profit, vary. And lack of informa-
tion regarding pertinent factors may make such a task difficult. Compare, however,
Louis Karsch, 8 T. C. 1327, 1332 (1947).
29. See INT. REv. CODE §§ 42(a), 126, 182. See Note, The Death of a Partner and
the Federal Income Tax, 50 CoL. L. REv. 658 (1950).
30. Against the Bureau the most clear cut cases are Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d
656 (7th Cir. 1950); Estate of William T. Jones, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. ff 44,028
(1944) (in both of which the partnerships were law firms) ; Mignonette E. Luhrs, P-H
1950 TC MEm. DEC. f1 50,160 (1950) (partnership to operate orange grove) ; H. R. Smith,
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
obviously earned income and such other items as good will, furniture, fixtures,
library, and cash appears of questionable desirability in the handling of the
partner-taxpayer's problem.
In Swiren v. Commissioner,3 ' the most recent case to consider the alloca-
tion question, an agreement of sale specified that taxpayer assign "all his
share and interest" in the name and good will, all furniture, fixtures, library,
cash, fees earned whether or not billed, and accounts receivable. 2 The tax-
payer reported the entire increase as capital gain, but the Commissioner
divided the items so that the favorable rates would not apply to the fees and
accounts receivable. 33 This apportionment the Tax Court sustained3" but the
Seventh Circuit reversed, relying on the proposition, which abstractly is valid,
that the "sale of an interest in a partnership is the sale of a capital asset,
regardless of the nature of the partnership properties."3 5 No distinction was
drawn between the Bureau's position on allocation and the comminution
argument which apparently had not been made.3 6 As a result, insufficient
consideration was given to the fairness and reason of the policy behind alloca-
tion.
Even though the argument for apportionment ultimately was rejected in
the Swiren case, it is unlikely that the Commissioner will abandon it: some
cases favor the Commissioner's approach.3 7 Despite the conflict of authority,
a firm stand by a taxpayer against allocation, even at the risk of litigation,
10 T. C. 398 (1948), affirmed, 173 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1949) (an oil field supplies firm) ;
L. F. Long, P-H 1947 TC MEM. DEC. If 47,155 (1947), affirmed, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.
1949) (a partnership to hold oilfield leases, rigs, and other assets). See also Thornley
v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1945); Walter J. Gresham, 8 T. C. M. 77
(1949). Contra: LeSage v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949) (automobile
dealership-here the earnings during negotiations for sale were lumped as part of the
interest. Held: Such earnings are taxable at ordinary rates and the interest at capital
rates) ; Doyle v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1939) (law firm) ; Helvering v.
Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937) (law firm) ; James W. McAfee, 9 T. C. 720 (1947)
(law firm) ; Louis Karsch, 8 T. C. 1327 (1947) (partnership to manufacture thread-that
portion disclosed by an audit to be income was taxed as income; the remainder was taxed
as capital gain.)
31. 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950).
32. Id. at 658.
33. The Commissioner in an amended answer unsuccessfully attempted to make a
much stricter allocation than his first. The second would have applied capital gains
rates only to the amount representing the value of the tangible assets. Petitioner con-
tended the added price was for good will. Max Swiren, 8 T. C. M. 924, 928 (1949).
34. Max Swiren, 8 T. C. M. 924 (1949).
35. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1950).
36. The Commissioner recognized in his deficiency notice to Swiren that the latter
had a proprietorship interest in the law firm. Max Swiren, 8 T. C. M. 924, 927 (1949).
Pervading the Tax Court opinion was an assumption that petitioner did have such an in-
terest. The Seventh Circuit, however, thought that the Bureau had followed its old argu-
ment that a partnership "interest" must be broken into its segments-that a sale was of
the interest in each specific asset. The Commissioner's deficiency notice would seem
to negative the correctness of the Circuit Court's position. See Swiren v. Commissioner,
183 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1950).
37. See note 30 supra.
NOTE 67
may sometimes be warranted. Within the seventh circuit non-allocation may
well be hazarded. And in other jurisdictions the attractiveness of a tax
saving in excess of litigation costs suggests the same approach.
When the conclusion is reached, in a particular case, that there is little
chance of total success on non-allocation, it will be more expedient for the
taxpayer, when filing, to allocate by his own formula; the imposition of an
unfavorable formula computed by the Bureau may be avoided.38 The amounts
which may be allotted to income represented by accounts receivable are often
variable. But once challenged, and it becomes impossible to secure a desirable
compromise, the taxpayer's allocation may be upheld.39
The second major condition to application of capital gains rates is the
six month holding period.4 ' The time passing between acquisition and sale of
a partnership interest is the measure of the holding period ;41 the time the
partnership has held each of the- individual assets comprising the interest is
not controlling.
Finally, the language of the agreement of sale and articles of partnership
deserves note.42 They may be indicative of an intent to pass an interest rather
than a share in specific assets as such; they can evince that the transfer of an
interest was actually effected.43 Thus a characterization in the sale agreement
that "all the right and title in the partnership business is transferred"4 4 is
advisable. Such characterization indicates that an interest in an earning unit
has passed and negates the idea that the several assets are desired for their
use individually. Including a list of the assets in addition to the omnibus
38. See note 33 supra.
39. "Inasmuch as the petitioner and the members of his former law firm made no al-
location between the various items involved in the settlement and there is no factual basis
by which the court may make an allocation, and as the determination made by the re-
spondent is, in our judgment, eminently fair to petitioner, it will not be disturbed . . ."
Max Swiren, 8 T. C. M. 924, 928 (1949). Had petitioner made a reasonable allocation,
the Tax Court may have approved it.
40. INT. REv. CODE § 117(b). See also INT. REv. CODE § 117(c) (2).
41. Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Thornley v. Commissioner,
147 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1945). See also Commissioner v. Smith, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.
1949) ; Kessler v. United States, 124 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1941).
42. Compare Kessler v. United States, 124 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1941) (in which there
was almost a complete lack of such evidence with a resulting decision that partnership in-
terests had not been exchanged for stock of a corporation formed to take over the partner-
ship business) with Thornley v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1945) (where in
subsequent litigation involving the same transfers much more evidence introduced as to
the agreement and bill of sale was held to indicate exchange of an interest).
43. "If the executors intended to part with the interests of their estates in the good
will of the old firm, and the new firm .. .intended to acquire the same, the question is
whether the agreements . . . and the acts of the parties constitute sufficient evidence
from which such a deduction could reasonably be made." Pope v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d
420, 423 (1st Cir. 1930). Estate of William T. Jones, P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. 1 44,028
(1944), similarly considered the partnership agreement although intent, as such, was not
discussed. See W. Frank Carter, 36 B. T. A. 60, 63 (1937).
44. Frank Killian, P-H 1944 TC MEA. DEC. 1 44,244 (1944).
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phrase, as is commonly done, will not detract from the inference that an
earning unit has passed if the compilation is complete. 45 Provisions in partner-
ship articles that grant remaining partners the option of buying a withdrawing
partner's interest indicate that the partners themselves considered the interest
valuable beyond the worth of the individual assets. 4' This is evidence that
earning capacity, not mere value, was the subject of the transfer. Inquiry into
the true nature of the sale justifiably will not be forestalled, however, by the
use of the description, "all the business and assets" of X, "a co-partnership,"
when facts reveal the disposal of a share in only a portion of the partnership
assets.
47
The quest for capital gains rates presupposes gain rather than loss upon
sale of an interest. Most contemporaneous sales produce profit to the seller.
However, the future may herald a price recession during which the greater
number of such sales will result in loss to the retiring or deceased partner.
What can be done to minimize the tax if this contingency occurs?
Comminution should not be argued; it is dead for both the Bureau and
the taxpayer.48 The partnership might liquidate its assets singly in order to
reduce busifiess capacity. Loss sustained arguably could be business loss, and
thus deductible under §2 3(e). But since this is a weak argument, it may be
advisable for the partnership to liquidate gradually over years, with several
yearly capital loss allowances more nearly absorbing the loss. If a taxpayer
desires sudden severance from the partnership, and wishes to avoid capital loss
limitations, 49 he might argue that the interest sold was an asset used in his
trade or business ;o thus ordinary loss deductions would be available under
45. For example, in Estate of Herbert B. Hatch, 14 T. C. 251 (1950), which involved
a partnership to sell, distribute, and repair motor vehicles, the vendors "as co-partners ...
[sold] ...all the business and assets of the Hatch Motor Company," except the General
Motors franchise, two automobiles, a substantial amount of cash, and the partnership
name. Only part of the liabilities were assumed by the purchaser. Held: No attempt
was made to buy interests, and the sale was of partnership assets as such. Taxation de-
pends on whether each specific asset did or did not conform to the § 117 definitions.
46. "Another indication that the partners recognized that their interest in the firm
had value was the right granted to buy a deceased partner's interest by payment of a lump
sum equal to his share of the firm's profits for the 30 months preceding his death, thereby
clearly indicating that the sum to be paid was determinable by the deceased partner's
interest in profits, not as such, but as a yardstick to value his interest in the partnership
at the time of his death. Estate of Bavier C. Miller, 38 B. T. A. 487, 493 (1938).
47. See note 45 supra. The factual line of demarcation now lies somewhere between
the Hatch case and United States v. Shapiro, 178 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1949). The Shapiro
partnership operated and owned an apartment house. It also owned a small percentage
of the bonds of another apartment company. In the sale taxpayer did not part with his,
share of the latter. The sale was nevertheless held to be of an interest in a partnership.
48. Where an interest had been disposed of and loss had been sustained, taxpayers had
no success, even before G. C. M. 26379, in arguing that only title to specific assets was
transferred. See, for example, Estate of Aaron Lowenstein, 12 T. C. 694 (1949) ; George
R. McClellan, 42 B. T. A. 124 (1940).
49. NT. REv. CODE §§ 117(d), 117(e).
50. Cf. Merrill v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1949).
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either §117(a) or §117(j). However, the most intelligent advice would
probably be for the withdrawing partner to dispose successively of his share
in the various assets; he should also refrain from describing the assignment
as that of an "interest." This may result in ordinary loss deductions to him
as to those items which are not capital assets under §117 (a).
